Skills and wage inequality in Greece: evidence from matched employer-employee data, 1995-2002 by unknown
 All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not  
necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE 
 
© Rebekka Christopoulou and Theodora Kosma 
 
 
 
 
Skills and Wage Inequality in Greece: 
Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee 
Data, 1995-2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rebekka Christopoulou and Theodora Kosma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GreeSE Paper No 26 
 
Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 
 
 
 
May 2009 
 
  
 
_
 
Table of Contents 
 
ABSTRACT _______________________________________________________ iii 
1. Introduction_______________________________________________________2 
2. Data and Timing ___________________________________________________6 
2.1. The sample ____________________________________________________7 
2.2. The timing: an overview of the Greek economy between 1995-2002 ____11 
3. Observed wage changes ____________________________________________13 
4. The Methodology _________________________________________________17 
5. Results __________________________________________________________21 
5.1. The added value of controlling for employer heterogeneity ___________21 
5.2. Interpreting price and composition effects _________________________26 
5.3. Wage changes due to skill _______________________________________28 
5.4. Market-forces versus predetermined changes ______________________37 
6. Conclusion _______________________________________________________39 
References _________________________________________________________42 
Appendix __________________________________________________________45 
 
 
                                                 
Acknowledgements 
This research was conducted under the scope of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) 
project coordinated by the European Central Bank. We are thankful for the help of the 
organisers, Frank Smets and Ana Lamo, the contact person of the micro group Juan F. 
Jimeno and all the WDN participants. We would also like to thank Vassilis 
Monastiriotis, Heather Gibson, Theodoros Mitrakos, Lia Papapetrou, Stephen Hall, 
Andreas Kornelakis and seminar participants at the Bank of Greece. Comments from 
seminar participants of the Economics Department of the University of Macedonia are 
also gratefully acknowledged. Finally, we would like to thank the National Statistical 
Service of Greece for providing access to the Structure of Earning Survey data to the 
Bank of Greece. Rebekka Christopoulou acknowledges financial support from the 
Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance. The views expressed in the paper are of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Greece, the European 
Central Bank or of the Hellenic Observatory. 
 
  
Skills and Wage Inequality in Greece: 
Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data, 1995-2002 
 
Rebekka Christopoulou# and Theodora Kosma* 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines changes in the Greek wage distribution over 
1995-2002 and the role of skill in these changes. The methodology 
adopted is the Machado-Mata counterfactual decomposition, which 
separates the part of wage changes that is due to job and workers' 
characteristics (composition effects) from the part due to the returns 
to these characteristics (price effects). We find that mean wages have 
not increased substantially, but wage inequality has, mostly at the 
upper tail of the distribution. The role of skill has been decisive. 
Falling tenure levels at all but the very high wage deciles, and rising 
education across the board, have carried much of the inequality-
increasing influence of overall composition effects. Although to a 
lesser extent, changes in the returns to skill have contributed to 
inequality by forming a U-shaped pattern along the wage 
distribution. This pattern is further reinforced when price-effects of 
skill are added together with the composition effect of tenure to 
produce the share of skill-effects that is responsive to market forces. 
Drawing on this evidence, we make a case for the routinization 
hypothesis. 
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Skills and Wage Inequality in Greece: 
Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data, 1995-2002 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Education and job experience are traditionally seen as the most important 
dimensions of ‘skill’ for labour market participants, going hand in hand with 
inequalities in labour market outcomes. Highly educated and experienced 
workers are typically the ones that receive the highest wages, the most job 
opportunities and the best working terms and conditions. In advanced 
economies, their labour market advantages have increased further through 
recent decades and, according to the consensus view, these increases have 
materialised differently for different levels of institutional ‘flexibility’. 
‘Liberal’ Anglo-Saxon markets have mostly experienced increases in wage 
inequality, while ‘coordinated’ continental European countries have mostly 
seen changes on the employment-side (Krugman 1994; Blanchard and Wolfers 
2000). As a result, a large and exciting international literature has developed to 
examine the macro shocks that are to blame for these trends. 
The skill-biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis, which assumes that 
technology in interaction with international trade biases labour demand in 
favour of the skilled and against the unskilled, has been the prevalent 
explanation since the early 90s (Katz and Autor 1999; Acemoglu 2002). Lately, 
however, it has been losing ground over the novel idea of ‘routinization’. 
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Routinization is a modified version of the SBTC hypothesis that takes the focus 
away from education and experience as carriers of bias and moves it to the type 
of job content and, in particular, to the degree that can be routinized. 
Specifically, it assumes that technology increases demand for both high-skilled 
and very low-skilled workers and decreases the demand for middle-skilled 
workers, as it replaces human labour mostly in routine tasks, which are 
typically the middle-skilled jobs (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003; Autor, Katz 
and Kearny 2006, 2008; Goos and Manning 2007; Goos, Manning and 
Salomons 2009). In addition, a different line of thought doubts the significance 
of technical change altogether. Arguing that inequalities by skill are mostly 
driven by non-market, mainly socio-demographic changes, this literature has 
justly earned itself the title of the ‘revisionist’ (Card and DiNardo 2002; 
Lemieux 2006). 
In comparison to these research dynamics, evidence for Greece is limited.  
Undoubtedly, since the early 1990s, and in the midst of continuous discussions 
regarding the quality of the Greek education system and a succession of 
educational reforms and counter-reforms by alternate governments, the effect 
of education on inequality and labour market performance has attracted much 
attention from Greek academics and policy-makers. In this climate, a group of 
applied economic studies emerged to examine the link between skills and pay. 
Most of them, however, focused mainly on the education dimension of skill, 
and have only partially explored the reasons behind the changes in the returns 
to education (Tsakloglou and Cholezas 2005 give a brief review). 
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The bulk of the Greek research utilizes the Household Budget Survey data that 
provide information on consumption expenditures, incomes and socio-
economic characteristics of the households and their members. This 
information has allowed the estimation of the returns to skills in the Greek 
labour market from the mid-1970s till the late 1990s in Mincer-type wage 
equations. The available evidence suggests that both overall wage inequality 
and the returns to education declined between the mid-1970s and the 1980s, but 
recovered again during the 1990s. This pattern has been attributed to 
interactions between an expanding educational system, a stagnant demand for 
educated workers, and changing institutional labour market structures (i.e. 
minimum wage and other income policies). 
However, as in many other countries, the returns to education seem to have 
evolved differently across the wage distribution. On this, especially, the 
empirical research on the Greek labour market has provided mixed results. In 
particular, by estimating Mincer wage equations on data from the early 1990s 
using quantile regressions, Martins and Pereira (2004) find that Greece is the 
only country out of 16 that shows higher returns to education at the lower end 
of the wage distribution. Conversely, Cholezas (2004) examines Greek wages 
for years 1974, 1988, 1994 and 1999, and finds that in most cases returns to 
education follow a U-shaped pattern across the wage distribution. 
This paper analyzes the role of skills in the dynamics of the Greek wage 
structure. Specifically, we examine how the distribution of individual's wages 
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has changed in Greece and what has been the contribution of education and 
experience to these changes (a) over a recent period (1995-2002); (b) using an 
employer-employee matched data set, which gives the opportunity to control 
for both worker characteristics and job or employer characteristics in the wage 
equations; and (c) employing a recently developed methodology of 
counterfactual decomposition by Machado & Mata (2005). This methodology 
takes a step forward from simple estimations of returns to skill; it separates the 
part of wage changes that is attributable to composition changes of individual 
or workplace characteristics (net composition effects) from the part that is due 
to changes in the returns to these characteristics (net price effects) and, 
ultimately, enables the isolation of the market-driven share of wage-change 
from the share that is due to predetermined socio-demographic factors (e.g. 
changes in age, educational participation etc.). 
We find that wage inequality over the period of study has increased; more so 
for men and those on the upper end of the wage distribution. Interestingly, 
unlike the experience of any other highly coordinated European labour market 
for which data is available, these trends in Greek wages are both qualitatively 
and quantitatively comparable to the trends observed in the liberal markets of 
the US and the UK over the same eight-year period. Skills have had a 
significant contribution to wage inequality; mostly through the composition 
effects of education and tenure. However small, the price-effects of skill 
formulates a familiar U-shaped pattern across the wage distribution: workers on 
the tails of the wage distribution appear to enjoy higher increases in the returns 
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to skill than those in the middle. We take this as evidence in favour of the 
routinization hypothesis. Our routinization hypothesis case becomes even 
stronger when we calculate the overall share of skill-effects that is attributable 
to market forces (i.e. the sum of price effects of skill and the market-responsive 
part of composition skill-effects) and find that not only does the U-shaped 
pattern persist but it is also boosted. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and comments 
on its timing, section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of wage-changes, section 
4 presents the methodology and section 5 the results. The discussion of the 
results is given in four stages; we comment on the added value of controlling 
for employer heterogeneity in section 5.1, in 5.2 we give a general introduction 
to the decomposition results, in 5.3 we focus on the skill-effects, and in 5.4 we 
isolate the market-driven from the predetermined skill-effects. A final section 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and Timing 
The data used in the empirical analysis are obtained from the Greek Structure 
of Earnings Survey (SES), which is compiled by the National Statistical 
Service of Greece. The Structure of Earnings Survey was first conducted in 
1995 in the EU member states with the aim of compiling a dataset comparable 
across countries. This dataset would then serve as a useful basis for analysing 
the progress of economic and social cohesion. The survey was again conducted 
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in 2002 and it has been decided that the survey will be repeated every four 
years.1 
The SES contains rich information on the structure and distribution of earnings 
and characteristics of employers and employees for two years: 1995 and 2002. 
Therefore, in comparison to household databases that have been used in the 
literature to date, the SES has two important advantages. First of all, it avoids 
the measurement error problems of the household surveys.2 Further, as already 
emphasized above, it enables controlling for both workers and firms 
characteristics when estimating wage equations. Moreover, its timing is also 
advantageous: it offers a more recent view of the labour market in comparison 
with previous studies and it coincides with a period of interesting economic 
developments. Next, the sample and its timing are discussed in turn. 
2.1. The sample 
The sample of the Structure of Earning Survey is constructed by three-
dimensional stratified random sampling covering firms of more than 10 
employees in sectors such as manufacturing, construction and services (NACE 
C-K). The process of deriving the sample is the following: in the first step a 
sample of firms from the firm registry is selected, in the second step the sample 
of the local units belonging to the firms of the first stage is selected, and in the 
                                                 
1
 More details on the aim of the Structure of Earning Survey can be found on the website of the 
National Statistical Service of Greece (www.statistics.gr). 
2
 It is widely documented in the literature that household surveys are contaminated with a significant 
degree of measurement error. Data on wages/income are mostly affected by this measurement error; 
individuals do not exactly recall their income and pay components or, for various reasons, do not like 
to provide accurate information on their income sources. 
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final step a sample of employees belonging to the local unit is selected. Before 
the selection, firms are classified into strata according to region, economic 
activity (NACE 2-digit) and firm size (defined by number of employees in the 
firm). 
The data available for the employees contain information on gender, age, the 
education level completed, tenure with the current employer3. The data on job 
characteristics describe the type of contract (part-time or full-time, contract of 
definite or indefinite length), the occupation, and whether the job entails 
supervisory duties. The data on employer characteristics contain information on 
the firm size, industry, location, main market in which the product of the firm is 
sold (regional, national, European or global), and the type of collective 
agreement enforced in the firm (national, sectoral, or firm level agreement).4 
The Structure of Earnings Survey also contains detailed information on the 
gross monthly earning of the employee, the various pay components such as 
overtime, irregular bonuses, hours worked and overtime hours. From the 
information provided we create the variable referring to hourly earnings 
including overtime and regular bonuses which we use in the econometric 
analysis. More precisely, we use real hourly earnings (deflated by the 
Harmonized CPI).  
                                                 
3
 In 1995, data on tenure with the current employer are available; for 2002, information on date the 
employee joined the firm is provided and the tenure variable is constructed accordingly. 
4
 The sample for 1995 covers around 3585 firms and 52975 employees; the 2002 sample covers around 
2907 firms and 48762 employees. 
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Before the econometric analysis we subject the data to a thorough ‘cleaning’. 
Incomplete or inaccurate observations are unavoidably deleted. Employees 
with age 15 to 65 are included; employees with earnings below the 1st and 
above the 99th percentiles are excluded. After the data inspection and cleaning 
we end up with 38701 observations for 1995 and 41449 for 2002. 
Table 1 provides selected information on the final ‘clean’ version of the 
sample. One can see the following relevant issues regarding the two waves of 
the Structure of Earnings survey: Firstly, following the widely-documented 
worldwide trend, the proportion of females has increased. Secondly, the 
average years of education have increased, a trend consistent with the general 
expansion of the educational system in the country. Thirdly, average tenure 
Table 1: Sample characteristics 
Employee characteristics 1995 2002 Change 
Female (%) 31.70 37.36 5.66 
Years of education (average) 10.57 11.49 0.92 
Years of tenure (average) 10.08 8.26 -1.82 
Age: 15-24 years (%) 5.92 7.30 1.38 
 25-34 years (%) 29.95 32.97 3.02 
 35-44 years (%) 34.09 30.26 -3.83 
 45-64 years (%) 30.01 29.44 -0.57 
Employer characteristics    
Private ownership  (%) 69.61 83.50 13.89 
Firm size: 10-19 employees (%) 9.74 12.35 2.61 
 20-49 employees (%) 21.90 16.71 -5.19 
 50-99 employees (%) 21.17 10.88 -10.29 
 >100 employees (%) 47.19 60.05 12.86 
Manufacturing sector (%) 48.30 36.13 -12.17 
Note: % refers to % of employees in the sample. 
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with the same employer has decreased. This might be explained by a series of 
developments in the Greek economy. Specifically, there has been an increase in 
the proportion of employees under contracts of definite length.5 Also, there has 
been an increase in newcomers in the labour force, mainly driven by the 
increase in the working age population. Moreover, there has been a process  of  
integrating  immigrants  in  the  Greek labour markets (the SESs have also  
started including them in the sample)6; immigrant workers are more likely to 
work with contracts of definite length and change jobs more often. 
Interestingly, there has also been an increase in the number of young workers 
in the sample. This matches the developments of the tenure variable, and could 
be explained by the increase of part-time jobs in Greece, which allows young 
people to combine education with labour force participation.7 
There are some changes in firm characteristics that are also worth mentioning. 
The proportion of employees working in the private sector has increased, and 
so has the proportion of employees working in bigger firms (with more than 
100 employees). The former fact may be related to the process of 
privatizations. Finally, the manufacturing employment seems to have followed 
a decreasing trend over the period under investigation. 
                                                 
5
 This is verified by the sample; the proportion of employees not having contracts of indefinite length 
has increased from around 2% in 1995 to 8.8% in 2002. 
6
 For a detailed analysis of Greek labour market developments between 1995 and 1999 see Sabethai 
(2000). 
7
 The increase in part-time jobs in Greece is reflected in the sample. In 1995 only 0.97% of the sampled 
employees was working under part-time status, while this number increased to 3.84% in 2002. 
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2.2. The timing: an overview of the Greek economy between 1995-2002 
Table 2 below provides various indicators that give a general picture of the 
economic environment in Greece over 1995-2002. This period was special for 
Greece as it coincided with the years preceding the euro adoption and the need 
to fulfil the accession criteria; one of them being the decrease in the inflation 
rate. As one can see in the table, Greece ‘delivered’ in terms of macroeconomic 
performance; it experienced a high and increasing GDP growth rate (at the 
same time that the growth rate in two of the EU's core countries, Germany and 
France, as well as in the US was low and decreasing). Following the 
requirement for the euro adoption, inflation was also significantly reduced, 
Table 2: Macroeconomic background, demographics, and market regulation 
  
1995 2002 Change 
Real GDP growth (2000 constant prices) 2.1 3.9 1.8 
Unemployment rate 9.0 10.3 1.3 
Inflation rate 9.8 3.7 -6.1 
Proportion of foreign labour force 3.7(1996) 5.5 1.8 
Female labour force participation 44.3 50.1 5.8 
Population share of 15-24  year-olds 20.4 19.3 -1.1 
Population share of 25-49 year-olds 51.3 54.4 3.1 
Population share of 50-64 year-olds 28.3 26.3 -2.0 
Trade in goods and services to GDP 18.8 23.3 4.5 
Share of ICT investment in total gross fixed capital formation 10.0 11.5 1.5 
Benefit replacement rates (average in the first 5 years of unem.)* 14.7 12.9 -1.8 
Minimum relative to median wages of full-time workers 0.53 0.49 -0.04 
Strictness of employer protection legislation (range 0-2)* 1.2 1.2 0.0 
Overall product market regulation (range 0-4) 2.8 (1998) 2.0 -0.8 
Source: OECD Statistics, except for those market with * that are unpublished and tentative (kindly 
provided by the Hellenic Observatory, LSE)  
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with the increase in the unemployment rate being a possible consequence of 
policies aiming for that reduction. 
In addition, the period 1995-2002 was also characterised by strong 
demographic, macroeconomic and institutional changes - some country-
specific and others common across advanced countries - that were directly 
affecting the labour market. For the demographic developments, we have 
already gotten a flavour from the description of the sample characteristics. The 
Greek labour market was experiencing a sharp increase in female labour force 
participation, like the majority of the OECD countries, and was also under a 
country-specific supply shock by a huge inflow of immigrants8. This could be 
one of the reasons why the share of prime-age population did not decrease in 
the country, which was what happened in other advanced countries in the same 
period (e.g. Germany, France and the US).  
At the same time, as shown by the measures of investment in Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) and trade-to-GDP, the Greek labour 
market was also under the influence of increasing technical change and trade 
openness; the two forces that, in interaction, have been found to induce a skill-
biased (or ‘routine-biased’) effect on labour demand. To add to this, 
institutional protectionism was decreasing, both in the labour and in the product 
markets.9 
                                                 
8
 This is documented in detail by Zografakis, Kontis and Mitrakos (2008). 
9
 It should be noted that the observed labour market deregulation can partly be an endogenous response 
to increasing international trade and product market deregulation. In particular, competition from low 
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On the whole, the period 1995-2002 is a very interesting one to examine for 
Greece. It is a period of high growth, characterised by technological changes, 
economic globalization and institutional reforms. This provides a unique 
opportunity to identify patterns of association between changes in the wage 
structure and skill-biased demand shifts or institutional features. 
 
3. Observed wage changes 
The direction, magnitude and nature of wage-changes between the two sample 
waves is roughly indicated by changes in the measures of mean and standard 
deviation, which amount to 0.052 and 0.087 log points respectively, when 
taking men and women together. These numbers reflect a pattern of slow and 
asymmetrical wage-movement. Still, it says little if not compared with similar 
changes in other countries. Figure 1 provides a comparison of the two measures 
between Greece and eight other EU countries, for which comparable SES data 
is available.10 Putting Ireland's and Hungary's impressive wage growth aside, 
Greece's average wage change is well in line with the experiences of the other 
European countries. The change in the standard deviation of hourly wage, 
though, stands out. After Germany, Greece is the second country in the group 
with the biggest increase in wage dispersion. 
                                                                                                                                            
cost producers due to trade may indirectly reduce trade unions' bargaining power and wages by 
decreasing the profits of domestic producers and reducing the scope and extent of profit sharing. The 
effect of product market deregulation works in the same way (for a discussion see Fiori et.al 2008). 
Note that the product market regulation indicator presented in Table 2 captures mainly barriers to entry. 
For a detailed description of its construction see Conway et. al (2005). 
10
 Changes are calculated over 1995-2002 in all cases, apart from Austria and Hungary (1996-2002), 
Belgium (1999-2005), and Germany (1995-2001). Numbers for category ‘all’ in Ireland,are calculated 
as weighted averages of those for categories ‘males’ and ‘females’. 
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How exactly has this sizeable increase in wage dispersion reshaped Greece's 
wage structure? Figure 2 and Table 3 describe the shift in the Greek wage 
distribution in detail, serving to reveal a very interesting picture. In the 
aggregate sample, real hourly wages have remained more or less constant up to 
the 5th decile of the distribution and have monotonically increased thereafter. 
Figure 1: Changes in mean and st. deviation of hourly wages by country 
(log points) 
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In other words, the moderate increase in mean wages has not been shared 
equally among the labour force, but rather the wealthy have become better off 
while the poor have remained equally poor. 
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It is noteworthy that this pattern in wage structure dynamics is unique in the 
group of the nine European countries included in Figure 1. In Christopoulou, 
Jimeno and Lamo (2008) it is shown that, although both Germany and the 
Netherlands have experienced comparable increases in overall wage inequality, 
in both cases the inequality has affected mostly those on the lower end of the 
wage distribution. In fact, the Greek experience appears to be quantitatively 
and qualitatively closer to that of the US, than to any of the European countries 
for which data is available. 
Figure 2: Real hourly wages by decile 
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Like the Greek data, US household data over the same eight-year period show a 
minimal movement in lower-tail inequality combined with a significant 
increase (around 0.05 log points) in upper-tail inequality (Autor, Katz and 
Kearny 2006). Data from the UK also show a similar pattern (Machin and Van 
Reenen 2007). This result comes as a surprise, especially considering that 
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despite the strong trend towards deregulation, the institutional structure of the 
Greek labour market still fits better into the ‘European paradigm’ of high 
coordination, thought to work towards wage compression, rather than the 
‘Anglo-Saxon paradigm’ of institutional liberalism. 
When disaggregating the sample by sex, the picture becomes slightly different. 
Specifically, the wage movement is still concentrated at the upper part of the 
distribution for both men and women. For men, however, at the bottom of the 
distribution one can clearly see some wage falls, which wear out when moving 
towards the middle, switching to wage increases after the 5th decile. In 
contrast, wages of women have  not  decreased at all. Instead, starting from a 
low relative wage level in 1995, women have been catching up, experiencing 
wage increases from the 2nd decile of the distribution onwards. In 
consequence, overall increase in wage inequality has been larger for men than 
women. 
Table 3: Key indicators of the wage distribution 
    Std. Dev Median D90/D10 D50/D10 D90/D50 Gini coef. 
All 1995 0.38 1.88 1.69 1.30 1.30 0.22 
 2002 0.47 1.89 1.85 1.33 1.40 0.27 
 Change 0.09 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.05 
Males 1995 0.38 1.98 1.67 1.32 1.27 0.22 
 2002 0.48 2.01 1.86 1.37 1.36 0.28 
  Change 0.10 0.03 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Females 1995 0.32 1.67 1.59 1.21 1.31 0.19 
 2002 0.41 1.73 1.74 1.25 1.39 0.24 
  Change 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.05 
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These different experiences come in confirmation of our decision to analyse 
wage changes both for the sample as a whole and separately by sex, on the 
assumption of segregation between male and female labour markets. Our 
assumption is in line with a long-standing tradition, starting with Bergman's 
(1971, 1974) pioneering work in the early 1970s, and subsequently followed by 
a long list of literature. The reasons for it stretch from sex discrimination on the 
demand-side to female self-selection in certain occupations on the supply-side 
(e.g. occupations that require smaller human capital investment, as women 
anticipate shorter and less continuous work-lives than men; occupations more 
compatible with the performance of household work (mummy tracks); and 
occupations that are traditionally dominated by women (social discrimination)). 
Strong evidence of sex discrimination in the Greek labour market from a series 
of empirical studies analysing the earnings gap between sexes also endorses the 
segregation assumption (e.g. Patrinos and Lambropoulos 1993; Kanellopoulos 
and Mavromaras 2002; Papapetrou 2004). 
 
4. The Methodology 
The analysis relies on the estimation of extended Mincer equations for log 
(real) hourly wages at different deciles of the wage distribution for each year t, 
using the quantile regressions method: 
∑ =++=
j
itjitjtitit XXwQwithXaw ϑϑϑϑϑϑϑϑ βεβ )|(ln,ln
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where wi represents the wage of individual i, X is the vector of observable 
labour market characteristics, 
∂
ita
 is a constant, and βϑ is the vector of 
parameters. Qϑ(lnw|X) denotes the ϑth conditional quantile of lnw given X. ε is 
the stochastic error. Given these estimates, we decompose the change between 
the 1995 and 2002 log wage distributions into a part that is due to changes in 
labour market characteristics (net of any return effects) and a part that is due to 
changes in the returns to these characteristics (net of any composition effects). 
This essentially involves decomposing the difference between two 
counterfactual densities: (i) the wage density corresponding to the 1995 
distribution of characteristics with returns held constant at 2002 levels, and (ii) 
the wage density corresponding to the 2002 distribution of labour market 
characteristics with returns constant at 1995 levels. In the spirit of the Oaxaca 
(1973) technique, recently extended by Machado and Mata (2005), we perform 
this decomposition by decile. 
The linearity of the quantile regression implies: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑ −+−+−+−=−
j j
jjjjjj XXXaaww
ϑϑϑϑϑϑϑϑϑϑϑϑ εεβββ 950295950295020295029502 lnln
 
Where wtϑ is the ϑth decile of the wage distribution in year t, Xjtϑ is the vector 
of mean characteristics of decile ϑ and year t, and εtϑ is the mean of the 
unobserved component. 
We carry out the computation of mean characteristics by decile according to 
the adaptation of the Machado-Mata bootstrap method by Albrecht, Bjorklund 
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and Vroman (2003). To describe it in simple terms, for each year, we draw a 
random sub-sample of 100 observations (i.e. individuals) from the whole 
sample. We sort the observations of the sub-sample by hourly pay and obtain 
the resulting decile values of the variables of interest. We repeat these steps 
500 times, obtaining 500 values per variable in each decile. We then calculate 
the average of these 500 values in each decile, ending up with 10 values per 
variable (i.e. one for each decile). 
Once the mean characteristics have been calculated, the wage change by decile 
over the period 1995-2002 are decomposed as follows: ( )ϑϑ 9502 aa −  is due to 
changes in unobserved features common among employees and due to changes 
in the reference categories (dummies); ( )∑ −
j
jjj XX
ϑϑϑβ 950202  is due to changes in 
(employer or employee) observable characteristics net of any price effects 
(composition effect);  ( )∑ −
j
jjj X
ϑϑϑ ββ 959502  is due to changes in the returns to 
(employer or employee) characteristics net of any composition effects (price 
effects); and ( )ϑϑ εε 9502 −  is due to changes in the remaining unobserved 
component. 
It is customary in the empirical analysis of Mincer equations X to include only 
variables representing individual/employee characteristics (i.e. educational 
level, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, a constant, and a gender dummy 
for aggregated samples). An important reason for this is that the arrival of 
matched employer-employee datasets has been relatively recent. In a sweeping 
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review of the international literature, Abowd and Kramarz (1999) note that 
virtually all papers using matched employer-employee data appeared after the 
late 1990s and, in their majority, the databases used have been European. In the 
case of Greece this is the first time that such a database becomes available. 
Taking advantage of the extra information, we start by estimating Mincer 
equations in two alternative specifications (subscripts t and i are suppressed for 
simplicity): 
∑ ++=
j
jj Xaw
ϑϑϑϑϑ εβln      (1) 
     ∑ ∑ +Χ++=
j
jj Xaw
ϑ
κ
ϑ
κ
ϑ
κ
ϑϑϑϑ εββln     (2) 
Where j now indicates individual characteristics and k employer or job 
characteristics.11 This exercise allows us to show that our understanding of the 
sources of earnings variation is refined to a significant extent when controlling 
for both worker and workplace heterogeneity, as opposed to controlling for 
worker heterogeneity only. We then focus the discussion on the estimates of 
specification 2. 
 
                                                 
11
 The variables used to capture individual characteristics are: years of education, tenure in years, 
tenure squared, age dummies, dummy for gender, dummy for vocational degree. The variables used to 
capture the respective employer characteristics are: sector dummies, occupational dummies, size 
dummies, dummy for private ownership, dummies for the main market for the firms' products, regional 
dummies, and dummies for collective agreement. 
  21 
5. Results 
5.1. The added value of controlling for employer heterogeneity 
Regressions using worker-based datasets typically explain about 30% of wage 
variation. This is also the case for the Greek results derived from Household 
Budget Survey data (see for instance Table 7 in Tsakloglou and Cholezas 
(2005)). With this as a benchmark, Table 4 presents the estimated R² values 
corresponding to OLS estimations from the SES database by specification, 
year, and sex-group. Markedly, regressions using only individual 
characteristics explain 40-53% of wage variation, which is already a significant 
improvement in explanatory power. However, the incorporation of controls for 
employer/job characteristics increases the proportion explained even further, to 
as much as 63%. A similar pattern appears when looking at the residual 
standard deviation (RSD), the classic measure of within-group wage inequality 
à la Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991, 1993), which is also reported in Table 4. 
Within-group or ‘unexplained’ wage inequality appears larger for specification 
1 than for specification 2 for all years and samples. 
At the same time, the inclusion of employer characteristics also alters the wage 
effects of key factors. For example, if one looks at the estimated OLS 
coefficients (Table A1 in the Appendix), while specification 1 suggests that the 
return to 10 years' education is about 33% in 1995, this falls to 17% once the 
regression is estimated using information on both employers and employees in 
specification 2. 
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Table 4: Estimated R²-adjusted and RSD from OLS regressions 
  
 1995    2002  
  All Males Females  All Males Females 
R²-adj. Spec. 1 0.47 0.40 0.43  0.53 0.52 0.45 
 Spec. 2 0.58 0.53 0.57  0.63 0.62 0.60 
RSD Spec. 1 0.28 0.29 0.29  0.32 0.33 0.33 
  Spec. 2 0.25 0.25 0.28  0.28 0.29 0.30 
Such differences between the two specifications are also manifest in the results 
of the quantile regressions.12 For instance, in line with Choleza's (2004) 
findings for Greece and similar findings for other countries (e.g. Machado and 
Mata 2005 for Portugal; Izquierdo and Lacuesta 2006 for Spain)13, the returns 
to education appear to increase across the wage distribution in both 
specifications. Also, they increase across time at every point of the distribution 
in both specifications. However, the increases suggested by specification 1 are 
always larger in magnitude than the increases suggested by specification 2. The 
same goes for the coefficients of the sex dummy. In both specifications, they 
reflect a wage-penalty for being a woman that increases in high paid jobs and 
decreases in time. However, the magnitudes suggested are always higher for 
specification 1. The story is similar for the majority of the coefficients on 
employee characteristics. Qualitatively, the two specifications provide the same 
results but, quantitatively, part of the effect attributed to employee 
                                                 
12
 Detailed quantile regression results are presented in Tables A1-A6 in the Appendix. 
13
 It should be noted that this result is at odds with the findings of Martins and Pereira (2004) for 
Greece; they find that returns to education are higher at the lower quantiles. This counterintuitive result 
may be due to the hourly earnings variable they use and/or due to the fact that they do not account for 
employer characteristics. (They use net hourly earnings. As the authors claim the latter measure is 
influenced by progressive taxation; this may provide inaccurate results for the returns to education for 
Greece - returns to education are eroded at higher wage quantiles.) 
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characteristics in specification 1 is shifted to employer characteristics in 
specification 2. 
This is indicative of the correlation between employee and employer 
characteristics, widely discussed in the literature. Take occupation categories as 
an example. These (at least at 1-digit level) are defined as skill-categories and 
are, thus, expected to be highly correlated with the education variable. In the 
absence of controls for occupation, the education variable captures some of the 
occupation-specific premia. Therefore, controlling for both education and 
occupation, as we do in specification 2, provides more information, and the 
impact of collinearity is kept limited due to the large sample size. 
As additional evidence, Figure 3 presents the respective decomposition 
outcomes for each specification, i.e. the breakdown of observed wage changes 
in composition and price effects by decile. Evidently, when compared to 
specification 2, specification 1 underestimates the composition effects along 
the entire wage distribution. Moreover, it appears to overestimate the price 
effects at high deciles and to underestimate them at low deciles. In other words, 
the contribution of price and composition effects to wage inequality differs 
significantly between specifications. Specifically, for specification 1, the 
composition effects at the 9th decile are 0.12 log points higher than at the 1st 
decile, while the same difference for the price effects is 0.21. Likewise, the 
differences between the 9th and 5th deciles is 0.17 and 0.14, respectively. In 
contrast, for specification 2, the difference between the 9th and 1st deciles is 
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now 0.22 log points for the composition effects and 0.05 for the price effects, 
while the respective differences between the 9th and the 5th deciles are 0.24 
and 0.02. 
This suggests that controlling for employer characteristics may be important for 
the ongoing   debate   between   revisionists   and   the   supporters   of  the  
market-forces explanation of wage dynamics. More specifically, as opposed to 
changes in characteristics that can capture both responses to market forces and 
predetermined socio-economic changes (e.g. changes in the age structure, 
female labour force participation, educational participation etc.), changes in the 
prices of characteristics can be plausibly linked to market forces alone. 
Evidently, according to specification 1, wage-inequality is driven mostly by 
‘price-side’ changes in characteristics, while specification 2 puts more weight 
on ‘quantity-side’ changes to characteristics. 
An important common result of the two specifications should also be 
acknowledged. Both suggest that ‘price-side’ effects have been favourable for 
wages throughout the wage distribution, and that the wage-falls that took place 
at the lower deciles are strictly attributable to ‘quantity-side’ effects.
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Figure 3: Breakdown of wage changes into composition and price effects 
by decile 
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5.2. Interpreting price and composition effects 
By using all the available information, specification 2 inspires more 
confidence, but what do these results say about the Greek labour market? For 
example, how can one explain the observed composition (`quantity-side') 
effects? Looking back at the information provided in Tables 1 and 2, one can 
quickly identify three candidate causal factors. Firstly, on the employers' side, 
there is the expansion of the services sector, the shrinking of the manufacturing 
sector, and the respective decrease in blue collar jobs in relation to white collar 
jobs. Secondly, there is the much-discussed shift towards more flexible labour 
market institutions. Thirdly, on the employees side, there has been a higher 
supply of workers at the lower deciles of the wage distribution as a result of 
foreign migration inflows. All else equal, these factors exert qualitatively the 
same effect on wages; that is, they push them downwards for those at the lower 
deciles of the distribution and tend to raise them for those at the high deciles. 
So, even if the returns of the employers' and employees' characteristics had 
remained at 1995 levels, these compositional changes would still imply a high 
increase in wage inequality. 
However, the returns to characteristics did not remain constant during the 
period. As shown above, their autonomous contribution to overall wage 
changes has been positive throughout the distribution. Possibly driven by skill-
biased market forces, they even pushed towards more wage inequality, 
favouring those at high wage deciles.  
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What is also interesting is the difference in price and composition effects 
between sexes. When looking at men only, composition effects are larger in 
absolute value than price effects at most deciles, while, for women, it is price 
effects that dominate over composition effects. In fact, the domination of the 
price effects is strong enough to make no allowance for wage falls. The reason 
for this is probably a combination of decreasing sex discrimination at the 
workplace, and female employment being concentrated in occupations or 
industries sheltered from adverse market forces and to compositional shifts 
than male employment. For example, the difference in the return effects by sex 
could be partly explained by skill-biased technical change, as this is less likely 
to affect wages in pink-collar jobs as opposed to blue-collar jobs, and, by 
extension, women as opposed to men. Similarly, the difference in the 
composition effects could be explained by the decline in industries intensive in 
blue collar jobs, as well as the migration inflows at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, which are likely to affect men more than women. 
Nonetheless, at this level of aggregation in the decomposition, any conclusions 
regarding the causal forces of wage-changes can only be tentative. To 
understand the specifics, one is better off looking at the price and composition 
effect of each individual variable/characteristic. We do this in the section that 
follows, and in accordance with the tradition of human capital theory, where 
skills are seen as the main drivers of wages, we focus on employee 
characteristics. This presents the opportunity to test two hypotheses. Firstly, by 
disaggregating the compositional effects, we can test whether rising education 
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in Greece has pushed towards lower wage inequality in line with conventional 
wisdom; and, secondly, by disaggregating the price effects, we can look for 
evidence on the hypothesis of skill-biased demand shifts, which prevails in the 
literature. 
5.3. Wage changes due to skill 
Table 5 presents the breakdown of wage changes into price and composition 
effects of each employee characteristic/skill. The list of employee 
characteristics we control for is: age as a proxy of general labour market 
experience, years of education, tenure as an indicator of job-specific 
experience, a dummy variable for holders of vocational degrees and a dummy 
variable for females in the aggregated sample. Due to the fact that our 
information on age is given in age bundles rather than in exact years, our 
regressions included a dummy variable per age-bundle.14 
In Table 5, we present the decomposition results for age in two categories: the 
youth or minimal experience category that refers to employees with less than 
25 years of age and corresponds to the first age-bundle, and the prime-age adult 
or medium-high experience category that refers to those with 25 or more years 
of age and aggregates the effects of the three remaining age-bundles. The 
decomposition results for tenure include the combined effects of tenure and 
tenure-squared. 
                                                 
14
 For this reason it was not possible to include age-squared as a variable in the regressions to account 
for non-linear age effects. 
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Table 5a: Composition and price effects due to employee characteristics by decile, all 
 D10 D20 D30 D40 D50 D60 D70 D80 D90
Observed wage change -.0214 -.0141 -.0080 -.0077 -.0074 .0480 .0997 .1474 .1953
 
Total composition effects -.0819 -.0682 -.0794 -.0936 -.0921 -.0522 -.0002 .0596 .1452
of which due to: Age (if < 25) -.0096 -.0175 -.0062 -.0064 -.0068 .0012 -.0006 -.0007 -.0023
 Age (if > 24) .0056 .0016 -.0047 -.0005 -.0065 -.0119 -.0074 -.0074 .0035
 Education .0106 .0172 .0151 .0150 .0134 .0214 .0108 .0202 .0308
 Tenure -.0567 -.0581 -.0580 -.0668 -.0803 -.0574 -.0495 -.0331 .0088
 Vocat. degree -.0003 -.0003 -.0006 -.0006 -.0006 -.0001 -.0002 .0003 .0000
 All skills -.0504 -.0571 -.0544 -.0593 -.0808 -.0468 -.0469 -.0207 .0408
 Sex (female) .0010 .0010 -.0077 -.0086 -.0018 -.0123 -.0159 -.0138 -.0103
  
Total price effects .0349 .0418 .0512 .0647 .0683 .0829 .0948 .0847 .0888
of which due to: Age (if < 25) -.0050 -.0045 -.0039 -.0017 -.0010 -.0006 -.0008 -.0002 -.0002
 Age (if > 24) -.0280 -.0523 -.0533 -.0603 -.0690 -.0666 -.0619 -.0600 -.0457
 Education .0395 .0359 .0306 .0263 .0223 .0296 .0273 .0311 .0341
 Tenure .0240 .0185 .0118 .0101 .0069 .0083 .0134 .0176 .0211
 Vocat. degree -.0012 -.0016 -.0029 -.0041 -.0049 -.0070 -.0070 -.0086 -.0061
 All skills .0293 -.0040 -.0177 -.0279 -.0457 -.0363 -.0290 -.0201 .0032
 Sex (female) .0067 .0155 .0154 .0117 .0117 .0087 .0085 .0065 .0027
 
Table 5b: Composition effects due to employee characteristics by decile, males 
 D10 D20 D30 D40 D50 D60 D70 D80 D90
Observed wage change -.0457 -.0412 -.0297 -.0129 .0269 .0835 .1237 .1741 .2111
 
Total composition effects -.1066 -.0920 -.0905 -.0666 -.0804 .0345 .0537 .1389 .1820
of which due to: Age (if < 25) -.0142 -.0215 -.0085 .0017 -.0042 -.0038 -.0014 -.0008 -.0008
 Age (if > 24) -.0008 -.0061 -.0129 -.0038 -.0145 -.0138 -.0058 .0091 .0111
 Education .0098 .0295 .0228 .0158 .0134 .0229 .0193 .0168 .0288
 Tenure -.0619 -.0723 -.0739 -.0701 -.0757 -.0464 -.0357 .0016 .0233
 Vocat. degree -.0005 -.0013 -.0004 -.0004 -.0002 .0000 .0002 .0000 .0017
 All skills -.0677 -.0718 -.0730 -.0567 -.0812 -.0413 -.0234 .0267 .0641
 
 
Total price effects .0358 .0342 .0515 .0533 .0590 .0442 .0619 .0507 .0331
of which due to: Age (if < 25) -.0044 -.0021 -.0017 -.0014 -.0004 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
 Age (if > 24) -.0247 -.0579 -.0499 -.0598 -.0652 -.0637 -.0637 -.0613 -.0452
 Education .0367 .0330 .0335 .0255 .0403 .0375 .0525 .0471 .0400
 Tenure .0191 .0143 .0106 .0008 .0009 .0027 .0076 .0177 .0329
 Vocat. degree -.0034 -.0031 -.0044 -.0065 -.0079 -.0088 -.0128 -.0087 -.0111
 All skills .0233 -.0158 -.0119 -.0414 -.0323 -.0323 -.0164 -.0053 .0166
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Table 5c: Composition effects due to employee characteristics by decile, females 
 D10 D20 D30 D40 D50 D60 D70 D80 D90
Observed wage change .0006 .0206 .0367 .0431 .0605 .0739 .1089 .1627 .2135
 
Total composition effects -.0657 -.0513 -.0436 -.0539 -.0423 -.0142 -.0148 .0681 .1207
of which due to: Age (if < 25) -.0035 .0000 -.0045 -.0046 -.0023 -.0049 -.0015 .0022 .0020
 Age (if > 24) -.0007 -.0011 -.0082 -.0014 -.0032 .0029 .0013 .0007 .0146
 Education .0073 .0194 .0160 .0125 .0145 .0156 .0115 .0215 .0127
 Tenure -.0451 -.0556 -.0384 -.0466 -.0526 -.0436 -.0386 -.0172 .0069
 Vocat. degree .0004 -.0001 -.0002 -.0007 -.0011 -.0005 -.0007 -.0001 .0000
 All skills -.0416 -.0374 -.0354 -.0407 -.0447 -.0306 -.0280 .0071 .0362
 
 
Total price effects .0224 .0527 .0671 .0826 .0883 .0963 .1123 .1168 .1303
of which due to: Age (if < 25) -.0089 -.0078 -.0060 -.0046 -.0041 -.0034 -.0040 -.0016 -.0020
 Age (if > 24) -.0355 -.0516 -.0642 -.0730 -.0650 -.0714 -.0929 -.0914 -.0679
 Education .0410 .0484 .0333 .0288 .0210 .0181 .0184 .0251 .0186
 Tenure .0262 .0270 .0225 .0232 .0283 .0280 .0243 .0174 .0222
 Vocat. degree .0000 -.0002 -.0004 -.0003 -.0006 -.0006 -.0009 -.0010 -.0029
 All skills .0227 .0158 -.0148 -.0260 -.0203 -.0293 -.0552 -.0515 -.0320
Looking, first, at the contribution of skills to the composition effects, already 
provides confirmation of their leading role in the determination of wages. The 
estimated composition effects of all skills together account for the biggest part 
of overall composition effects, especially up to the 7th decile, for as long as 
overall composition effects are negative. Their relative significance is much 
lower at the two highest wage deciles, where the key role is played by 
employer characteristics.15 
The negative part of the composition effects appears to come primarily from 
the tenure variable. The negative tenure effects are, in turn, a good reflection of 
the decrease in the per capita levels of job-specific experience in the sample, at 
                                                 
15
 For the complete accounting of the decomposition results see Table A7 in the Appendix. 
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all but the last two wage deciles.16 The repercussion is a strong push towards 
higher wage inequality. 
In contrast, general job market experience, as proxied by the age dummies, do 
not have an equally noticeable contribution to the way the wage distribution 
evolved. The respective composition effects are smaller in magnitude and they 
follow no regular pattern across the distribution.  
Regarding educational attainment, our results are similar with the ones 
provided for Spain over the same period from Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2006) 
and for Portugal over 1986-1995 from Machado and Mata (2005). Education is 
the only skill that has had a positive composition effect at all wage deciles, 
reflecting the general expansion of the educational system. However, although 
education has risen almost uniformly across the distribution, the estimated 
composition effects appear to have led to more wage inequality. Specifically, 
for the aggregate sample, the composition effect of education at the 9th wage 
decile is 2.90 times higher than at the 1st decile. For males, the respective ratio 
is 2.93 and, for females, it is 1.74. This result is rather unexpected, given that 
rising education increases the proportion of the skilled in the labour force and 
induces their relative wages to fall, thus, pushing towards lower wage 
inequality. However, there is another factor to consider. The returns to 
education tend to be more dispersed among high skilled workers than low 
skilled workers and, therefore, rising education also pushes towards more wage 
                                                 
16
 The evolution of mean tenure by decile is presented in Figure A1 in the Appendix, along with all the 
(bootstrapped) mean employee characteristics (Xjt). 
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inequality. Which effect dominates is an empirical issue. For the case of Greece 
in the period 1995-2002, like for Portugal and Spain, the evidence suggests that 
the latter effect is the one that has prevailed. 
Turning the focus on the price effects makes the story even more interesting. 
As already mentioned, total price effects have had a significant contribution to 
overall wage changes, but they have been more equally spread across the 
distribution than composition effects, and their contribution to wage inequality 
has been relatively mild. Taking this at face value would imply that global 
market forces, like technical change and trade internationalization, that have 
been shown to significantly affect the wage distributions of other advanced 
economies, have only had minor effects on the Greek wage distribution. But, as 
already mentioned part of the market-forces influence on wages is reflected in 
the composition effects. Moreover, looking at price effects due to skill-changes 
in isolation from price effects due to changes in employer characteristics also 
amends this narrative. 
Evidently, even though overall price effects appear to have pushed wages 
upwards, price effects due to skill are mostly negative, and tend to be larger at 
the middle wage deciles. This implies that the presence of skilled-biased 
market forces that have favoured workers in the tails of the wage distribution at 
the expense of those in the middle of the distribution. 
For clarity of exposition, Figure 4 plots the price effects due to education, 
general labour market experience (age > 24) and job-specific experience 
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(tenure) by decile and sex. Price effects due to total skill changes are also 
plotted, indicated by the shaded area. Noticeably, for the aggregate sample and 
for the sample of males only, the price effects form a clear U-shaped pattern 
across the wage distribution. This pattern is also reflected in the changes of the 
estimated returns over 1995-2002 for most skill variables.17 
Figure 4: Changes in price effects due to skill by decile 
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We interpret this as evidence in favour of the routinization hypothesis, i.e. we 
take the decrease in the relative returns to skill for workers at the middle wage 
deciles as a symptom of technology that replaces human labour in routine 
middle-skilled jobs. To give an example relevant to the Greek tourism industry, 
with internet bookings of hotel rooms and flights booming, it is only reasonable 
                                                 
17
 Changes in the returns to skill are plotted in Figure A2 in the Appendix. Interestingly, our estimates 
of the changes in the returns to education over 1995-2002 differ from the equivalent estimates of 
Cholezas (2004) over 1994-1999. In contrast to our U-shaped pattern, Cholezas finds that changes in 
the returns to education increase monotonically when moving along the wage distribution. However, 
apart from the difference in the period under study, Choleza's findings are derived without controlling 
for employer characteristics. 
  34 
for hotel owners and travel agents to be increasingly frugal in paying for skilled 
administrative staff. Similarly, with the growing availability of audio guides in 
museums and archeological sites, the returns to education for tourist guides and 
translators are also expected to only rise modestly. 
When women are examined separately than men the U-shaped pattern is not 
sustained. Instead, the estimated price-effects display a downward trend when 
moving along the wage distribution, especially so the price effects due to 
education and age, reflecting again the respective changes in the returns to 
skill. To be more accurate, the price effects at the low wage deciles keep their 
advantage in comparison to the price effects in the middle of the distribution, 
but the advantage at the upper tail of the wage distribution that is observed for 
men disappears when looking at women. Given that any skill-biased forces that 
act in the market should normally affect men and women equally, we perceive 
this pattern as suggestive of discrimination against females at high-pay, high-
profile jobs. 
However, the distribution of the skill price-effects across wage deciles only 
draws part of the picture. Equally important are the direction and the magnitude 
of the estimated effects. Clearly, in all samples and deciles, price effects due to 
changes in education and tenure are positive, while price effects due to age are 
negative and relatively higher in absolute value. The implication is that, with 
skill composition held constant, market forces would have increased the returns 
to education and job-specific tenure, but they would have decreased the returns 
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to general labour market experience by a wider margin. And although there is a 
series of factors that could create a negative age-effect (e.g. discrimination 
against old people at the workplace), here ones needs to look for a factor that 
can also explain the U-shaped pattern. 
Technical innovation that raises the demand for more educated and more 
specialized labour force is a candidate market force that could have such an 
effect. Firstly, with the educational variable measured in number of years, one 
can take the age price-effect as capturing the unobserved and changing quality 
of educational qualifications. Academic degrees of older employees, especially 
those related to technology and computerization, tend to become more and 
more outdated in time and are, thus, of less value to employers than those of 
new graduates.  
Figure 5: Relative age price-effects of 15-24 and 25-54 year-olds 
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In addition, with job-specific tenure controlled for, the age variable is capturing 
general outside-the-job experience, which can be significantly de-valued under 
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conditions of strong technical change. More specifically, an increase in demand 
for job-specific technology users would favour the educated and long-tenured 
employees increasing the returns to education and tenure, and it would 
disfavour the ones that get de-skilled by changing jobs, thus, decreasing the 
returns to general (‘outside-the-job’) labour market experience. In this latter 
case, general labour market experience would work, in fact, as an ‘anti-skill’. 
To better demonstrate this point, Figure 5 plots the relative price-effects 
between the youth (minimal experience) and prime-age adult (some 
experience) groups across the wage distribution. Given that the estimated price-
effects for both age-groups are negative at all deciles, Figure 5 presents the 
relative wage losses due to general labour market experience by age. The result 
is categorical: the relative wage losses for youth monotonically decrease across 
the wage distribution. In other words, having minimal outside-the-job 
experience is less costly for high-skill high-pay jobs (where on-the-job training 
counts) than for low-skill low-pay jobs (where skills do not count much 
anyway). Again, this can be explained by forces that raise the demand for job-
specific skills as opposed to general labour market skills. 
Given the limitations of the age variable, though, spurious age effects are also a 
possibility. The age dummies provide a poor approximation of the time spent in 
the labour market and may, therefore, suffer from measurement errors and bias 
coefficient estimates when participation is not continuous (see Blau and Kahn 
2008), which could explain our results for females. 
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5.4. Market-forces versus predetermined changes 
We have now seen the contribution of skill to wage-inequality in detail. But, 
how do these results inform the debate between revisionists and the supporters 
of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis? In other words, how does the 
influence of market forces compare to that of predetermined socio-economic 
changes in the determination of overall skill-effects and, by extension, to wage 
inequality? 
To answer this we need to add all composition skill-effects that could be 
market-responsive  to  the  price  skill-effects.  In  the group of our skill-
variables, we identify tenure  as  the  only  one whose composition effects are 
not strictly predetermined; far from it, we expect tenure composition effects to 
be most often determined by the employers according to market conditions. In 
periods of high demand, we expect reduced firing to increase tenure and 
increased hiring to decrease it, and vice versa in periods of low demand. Which 
effect prevails is a empirical question; what is certain is that the market 
unresponsive part of tenure composition is expected to be low. 
So, we sum total price-effects of skill with the tenure composition effect and 
call it the market-responsive part of skill-effect. Then, in Figure 6, we plot it 
against the sum of the skill composition effects excluding that of tenure 
(attributable to predetermined socio-demographic changes). The result comes 
clearly in support of the routinization hypothesis. Not only is the U-shape 
observed in Figure 5 sustained with the addition of the tenure composition 
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effect to price-effects, but it is also enhanced, and now holds for both men and 
women. In comparison, the predetermined compositional effects are of very 
small magnitude, suggesting that they play a secondary role in the 
determination of skill-effects. 
Figure 6 also plots the overall observed wage changes (indicated by the shaded 
area). This serves to demonstrate two important points. First, that the skill-
effects attributable to market forces have contributed both towards the upper-
tail wage inequality observed in the wage distribution, and towards the wage-
compression observed in the lower half of the distribution. Secondly, as already 
emphasised several times, that the skill-effects give only part of the picture. 
There have been other important forces in the Greek labour market over 1995-
2002 - either unobserved or reflected in the job characteristics - that were 
pushing towards more wage inequality across the board, outweighing skill-
effects in the lower part of the distribution and reinforcing them in the upper 
half. 
To take the second point further, one needs to ask what lies behind the effects 
of the constant, the residual and the employer characteristics. Better even, at 
this stage, is to ask what is least expected to lie behind these effects. And the 
obvious answer is compositional   changes.   Most   employee   characteristics   
that  could   carry  strong compositional effects have been already controlled 
for (with the exception perhaps of ethnicity or citizenship status, to account for 
migration). 
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Figure 6: Skill-effects by source and observed wage changes 
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Moreover, if one goes through the employer or job characteristics one by one, 
s/he will find that most of them are expected to be largerly responsive to 
market conditions. This is true even for the unobservable institutional forces 
that could be partly reflected in the constant or the residuals. Therefore, we are 
more inclined to side against the revisionists' view, in general, and the 
conclusion of Tsakloglou and Cholezas (2005) about Greece in particular, both 
of which assign market forces a secondary role in the determination of wage 
inequality. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined how the wage structure has changed in Greece 
over 1995-2002 and what has been the contribution of skills to these changes. 
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We have used a matched employer-employee database, which allowed us to 
control for both worker and job heterogeneity in Mincerian regressions. 
Building on the regression results, we used the Machado-Mata decomposition 
method to separate the part of the wage changes that is due to job and workers' 
characteristics from the part due to the returns to these characteristics. 
Ultimately, this enabled us to join together the market-driven price and 
composition effects and examine them in isolation. 
The evidence suggests a small increase in Greek average wages combined with 
a significant increase in wage inequality, mostly because of sharp wage 
increases at the upper tail of the distribution. Interestingly, this experience is 
similar to that observed in the US and the UK during the same period, thus 
raising a question about the workings of labour market institutions both 
generally, and particularly in Greece.  
The contribution of skill to Greek wage inequality has been important and has 
come mostly from composition effects. Falling tenure levels at most but the 
very high wage deciles, have carried much of the inequality-increasing 
influence of overall composition effects. Markedly, the same holds for rising 
education across the entire wage distribution. The evidence suggests that even 
if the returns to education had remained constant, the observed increase in 
education would have led to increased wage inequality, as high-skilled jobs 
experience higher wage dispersion than low-skilled jobs. This result, which has 
also been found for Portugal by Machado and Mata, contradicts standard 
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expectations for a positive relationship between rising education and wage 
equality. We join Machado and Mata to argue that further investigation is 
needed to shed light on this finding, given its high policy relevance. 
Price effects due to skill have had a relatively lower impact on wage inequality, 
but, interestingly, they have formed a U-shaped pattern along the wage 
distribution. Interpreting this evidence to reflect the workings of skill-biased 
technical change, with the bias affecting mostly those in the middle of the wage 
distribution, we make a case for the routinization hypothesis. Joining the 
market-driven part of price and composition skill-effects also produced a U-
shaped pattern. In contrast, those remaining effects that are attributable to 
predetermined changes were of minor scale. The implication is that market 
forces have been in the driver's seat in the determination of skill-effects, 
contributing towards higher wage inequality in the upper tail of the distribution 
and towards wage-compression in the lower tail. 
Finally, an unambiguous outcome of the analysis is the key role played by 
employer or job characteristics. These appear to be driving composition effects 
at the upper end of the wage distribution, as well as price effects across the 
board. Given these findings, we believe that a closer examination of the 
employer/job characteristics and their contribution to wage inequality would be 
valuable. We intend to take this up in future research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: all, Year: 1995 
                                                                              Quantile estimations 
 
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Specification 1 
Min. years of 
education 0.0333 0.0216 0.0242 0.0266 0.0285 0.0311 0.0336 0.0362 0.0390 0.0426 
 [0.0004]***[0.0004]***[0.0004]***[0.0004]***[0.0005]***[0.0005]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0007]***[0.0009]***
Vocational 
degree 0.0678 0.0879 0.0879 0.0799 0.0831 0.0804 0.0761 0.0652 0.0498 0.0334 
 [0.0060]***[0.0068]***[0.0065]***[0.0060]***[0.0071]***[0.0075]***[0.0076]***[0.0084]***[0.0095]***[0.0114]***
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.2806 -0.1407 -0.1608 -0.1907 -0.2239 -0.2530 -0.2792 -0.3050 -0.3381 -0.4094 
 [0.0086]***[0.0096]***[0.0092]***[0.0086]***[0.0101]***[0.0107]***[0.0109]***[0.0121]***[0.0138]***[0.0168]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.1258 -0.0636 -0.0701 -0.0789 -0.0975 -0.1104 -0.1216 -0.1388 -0.1433 -0.1693 
 [0.0064]***[0.0072]***[0.0070]***[0.0064]***[0.0076]***[0.0081]***[0.0082]***[0.0092]***[0.0105]***[0.0127]***
Age:35-44 years 
old 0.0051 0.0378 0.0381 0.0397 0.0223 0.0154 0.0081 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0181 
 [0.0061] [0.0068]***[0.0065]***[0.0060]***[0.0072]***[0.0076]** [0.0077] [0.0085] [0.0097] [0.0117] 
Age:45-54 years 
old 0.0475 0.0519 0.0605 0.0613 0.0535 0.0509 0.0476 0.0422 0.0426 0.0402 
 [0.0060]***[0.0068]***[0.0065]***[0.0060]***[0.0070]***[0.0075]***[0.0076]***[0.0084]***[0.0095]***[0.0113]***
Tenure in years 0.0267 0.0283 0.0286 0.0288 0.0290 0.0291 0.0283 0.0283 0.0259 0.0213 
 [0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]***[0.0010]***[0.0013]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0283 -0.0307 -0.0284 -0.0286 -0.0290 -0.0297 -0.0276 -0.0310 -0.0265 -0.0204 
 [0.0023]***[0.0028]***[0.0026]***[0.0024]***[0.0028]***[0.0030]***[0.0030]***[0.0033]***[0.0037]***[0.0044]***
Sex: female -0.1799 -0.1002 -0.1248 -0.1446 -0.1594 -0.1773 -0.1916 -0.2122 -0.2404 -0.2674 
 [0.0032]***[0.0037]***[0.0035]***[0.0032]***[0.0037]***[0.0040]***[0.0040]***[0.0044]***[0.0049]***[0.0059]***
Constant 1.4314 1.1521 1.2213 1.2764 1.3395 1.3936 1.4550 1.5290 1.6302 1.8066 
 [0.0074]***[0.0077]***[0.0076]***[0.0072]***[0.0086]***[0.0092]***[0.0094]***[0.0104]***[0.0118]***[0.0140]***
Observations 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 
R-squared 0.47          
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Table A1: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: all, Year: 1995 (cont.) 
 Specification 2 
Min. years of 
education 0.0173 0.0122 0.0137 0.0150 0.0157 0.0164 0.0164 0.0177 0.0184 0.0194 
 [0.0006]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0012]***
Vocational 
degree 0.0643 0.0549 0.0551 0.0645 0.0686 0.0692 0.0705 0.0745 0.0607 0.0727 
 [0.0057]***[0.0076]***[0.0072]***[0.0061]***[0.0060]***[0.0064]***[0.0069]***[0.0072]***[0.0082]***[0.0120]***
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.2202 -0.1249 -0.1540 -0.1679 -0.1796 -0.1874 -0.2082 -0.2284 -0.2596 -0.2953 
 [0.0078]***[0.0103]***[0.0098]***[0.0083]***[0.0082]***[0.0087]***[0.0094]***[0.0098]***[0.0113]***[0.0166]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.1031 -0.0604 -0.0692 -0.0751 -0.0824 -0.0829 -0.0947 -0.1088 -0.1191 -0.1363 
 [0.0059]***[0.0076]***[0.0074]***[0.0062]***[0.0062]***[0.0065]***[0.0070]***[0.0075]***[0.0086]***[0.0126]***
Age:35-44  
years old 0.0100 0.0345 0.0279 0.0236 0.0174 0.0211 0.0141 0.0067 -0.0022 -0.0107 
 [0.0055]* [0.0072]***[0.0069]***[0.0059]***[0.0058]***[0.0061]***[0.0066]** [0.0069] [0.0079] [0.0116] 
Age:45-54  
years old 0.0420 0.0533 0.0492 0.0447 0.0423 0.0472 0.0389 0.0363 0.0295 0.0259 
 [0.0054]***[0.0072]***[0.0069]***[0.0058]***[0.0057]***[0.0060]***[0.0065]***[0.0068]***[0.0078]***[0.0113]** 
Tenure in years 0.0221 0.0228 0.0234 0.0237 0.0233 0.0226 0.0221 0.0208 0.0194 0.0171 
 [0.0006]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0007]***[0.0006]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]***[0.0013]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0197 -0.0209 -0.0205 -0.0203 -0.0183 -0.0159 -0.0155 -0.0144 -0.0148 -0.0137 
 [0.0021]***[0.0030]***[0.0028]***[0.0023]***[0.0023]***[0.0024]***[0.0026]***[0.0027]***[0.0030]***[0.0045]***
Sex: female -0.1513 -0.0876 -0.1100 -0.1239 -0.1354 -0.1487 -0.1594 -0.1725 -0.1889 -0.2059 
 [0.0031]***[0.0044]***[0.0041]***[0.0034]***[0.0033]***[0.0034]***[0.0037]***[0.0038]***[0.0043]***[0.0062]***
Constant 1.6430 1.3550 1.4441 1.4700 1.4914 1.6031 1.6843 1.7810 1.8638 2.0734 
 [0.0346]***[0.0436]***[0.0433]***[0.0369]***[0.0360]***[0.0381]***[0.0407]***[0.0432]***[0.0491]***[0.0690]***
Observations 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 
R-squared 0.58                   
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets. Specification 1 controls only for the 
individual characteristics listed. Specification 2 also controls for observable employer and job characteristics, namely: sector, occupation, 
firm ownership, region, firm size, main product market and level of collective agreement coverage. 
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Table A2: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: all, Year: 2002 
           
                                                                              Quantile estimations 
 
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
 Specification 1 
Min. years of 
education 0.0498 0.0335 0.0377 0.0416 0.0450 0.0473 0.0500 0.0525 0.0551 0.0602 
 [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** 
Vocational 
degree -0.0462 -0.0045 -0.0296 -0.0428 -0.0512 -0.0457 -0.0504 -0.0527 -0.0598 -0.0614 
 [0.0057]*** [0.0077] [0.0061]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0060]*** [0.0075]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0086]*** [0.0104]*** 
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.3486 -0.1722 -0.1989 -0.2298 -0.2813 -0.3321 -0.3796 -0.4140 -0.4776 -0.5348 
 [0.0094]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0100]*** [0.0102]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0098]*** [0.0124]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0144]*** [0.0173]*** 
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.2141 -0.1011 -0.1211 -0.1429 -0.1774 -0.2068 -0.2404 -0.2540 -0.2851 -0.3153 
 [0.0078]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0085]*** [0.0081]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0105]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0144]*** 
Age:35-44  
years old -0.0699 -0.0238 -0.0228 -0.0231 -0.0376 -0.0581 -0.0779 -0.0833 -0.1132 -0.1313 
 [0.0075]*** [0.0100]** [0.0080]*** [0.0081]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0079]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0114]*** [0.0138]*** 
Age:45-54  
years old -0.0111 0.0354 0.0372 0.0323 0.0132 -0.0081 -0.0249 -0.0321 -0.0534 -0.0601 
 [0.0073] [0.0099]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0080]* [0.0078] [0.0097]** [0.0098]*** [0.0110]*** [0.0133]*** 
Tenure in years 0.0299 0.0315 0.0300 0.0300 0.0301 0.0308 0.0307 0.0303 0.0295 0.0269 
 [0.0006]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** 
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0216 -0.0239 -0.0107 -0.0079 -0.0085 -0.0137 -0.0188 -0.0230 -0.0282 -0.0314 
 [0.0023]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0031]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0042]*** 
Sex: female -0.1559 -0.0973 -0.1131 -0.1262 -0.1395 -0.1479 -0.1585 -0.1704 -0.1896 -0.2201 
 [0.0034]*** [0.0047]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0044]*** [0.0045]*** [0.0050]*** [0.0061]*** 
Constant 1.3589 1.0599 1.1351 1.1903 1.2575 1.3330 1.4161 1.5016 1.6273 1.7845 
 [0.0088]*** [0.0111]*** [0.0089]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0094]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0117]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0135]*** [0.0161]*** 
Observations 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 
R-squared 0.53          
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Table A2: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: all, Year: 2002 (cont.) 
 Specification 2 
Min. years of 
education 0.0204 0.0162 0.0174 0.0180 0.0184 0.0186 0.0192 0.0201 0.0212 0.0223 
 [0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0006]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]*** [0.0014]***
Vocational 
degree -0.0101 -0.0053 -0.0080 -0.0115 -0.0093 -0.0102 -0.0122 -0.0129 -0.0216 -0.0194 
 [0.0052]* [0.0063] [0.0057] [0.0052]** [0.0055]* [0.0049]** [0.0060]** [0.0060]** [0.0071]*** [0.0108]* 
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.3000 -0.1552 -0.2030 -0.2230 -0.2443 -0.2608 -0.2894 -0.3055 -0.3453 -0.3907 
 [0.0084]***[0.0101]***[0.0091]***[0.0083]***[0.0089]***[0.0079]***[0.0099]***[0.0099]***[0.0115]*** [0.0179]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.1864 -0.0900 -0.1305 -0.1423 -0.1558 -0.1659 -0.1798 -0.1881 -0.2073 -0.2141 
 [0.0069]***[0.0082]***[0.0075]***[0.0068]***[0.0073]***[0.0065]***[0.0081]***[0.0082]***[0.0095]*** [0.0147]***
Age:35-44 years 
old -0.0629 -0.0143 -0.0406 -0.0424 -0.0519 -0.0525 -0.0591 -0.0630 -0.0685 -0.0625 
 [0.0067]***[0.0080]* [0.0072]***[0.0066]***[0.0071]***[0.0063]***[0.0078]***[0.0078]***[0.0091]*** [0.0140]***
Age:45-54 years 
old -0.0163 0.0201 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0065 -0.0107 -0.0193 -0.0242 -0.0260 -0.0203 
 [0.0065]** [0.0077]***[0.0070] [0.0064] [0.0068] [0.0061]* [0.0076]** [0.0076]***[0.0089]*** [0.0136] 
Tenure in years 0.0228 0.0295 0.0270 0.0250 0.0240 0.0227 0.0224 0.0213 0.0199 0.0174 
 [0.0006]***[0.0007]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0005]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.00086]***[0.0012]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0184 -0.0334 -0.0239 -0.0167 -0.0149 -0.0119 -0.0124 -0.0116 -0.0113 -0.0087 
 [0.0021]***[0.0025]***[0.0023]***[0.0021]***[0.0022]***[0.0019]***[0.0024]***[0.0024]***[0.0028]*** [0.0044]** 
Sex: female -0.1242 -0.0745 -0.0803 -0.0881 -0.1020 -0.1107 -0.1229 -0.1345 -0.1536 -0.1831 
 [0.0032]***[0.0040]***[0.0036]***[0.0032]***[0.0034]***[0.0030]***[0.0037]***[0.0037]***[0.0041]*** [0.0066]***
Constant 1.7875 1.3543 1.4882 1.5625 1.6458 1.7302 1.8099 1.8759 2.1417 2.2502 
 [0.0332]***[0.0395]***[0.0358]***[0.0326]***[0.0348]***[0.0309]***[0.0386]***[0.0386]***[0.0448]*** [0.0692]***
Observations 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 41449 
R-squared 0.63          
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets. Specification 1 controls only for the 
individual characteristics listed. Specification 2 also controls for observable employer and job characteristics, namely: sector, occupation, 
firm ownership, region, firm size, main product market and level of collective agreement coverage. 
 
  49 
Table A3: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: males, Year: 1995 
           
                                                                              Quantile estimations 
 
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
 Specification 1 
Min. years of 
education 0.0316 0.0230 0.0244 0.0257 0.0278 0.0296 0.0316 0.0340 0.0352 0.0382 
 [0.0005]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0006]***[0.0007]***[0.00086]***[0.0010]***[0.0012]***
Vocational 
degree 0.0652 0.0825 0.0848 0.0766 0.0804 0.0810 0.0720 0.0558 0.0421 0.0298 
 [0.0066]***[0.0080]***[0.0085]***[0.0078]***[0.0077]***[0.0078]***[0.0087]***[0.0100]*** [0.0114]***[0.0133]** 
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.3391 -0.1738 -0.2154 -0.2436 -0.2806 -0.3150 -0.3567 -0.4006 -0.4440 -0.5306 
 [0.0117]***[0.0142]***[0.0150]***[0.0138]***[0.0137]***[0.0140]***[0.0155]***[0.0179]*** [0.0207]***[0.0242]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.1529 -0.0807 -0.0929 -0.1119 -0.1311 -0.1506 -0.1646 -0.1844 -0.1921 -0.2194 
 [0.0078]***[0.0093]***[0.0099]***[0.0091]***[0.0091]***[0.0093]***[0.0103]***[0.0120]*** [0.0139]***[0.0163]***
Age:35-44  
years old -0.0056 0.0351 0.0321 0.0257 0.0044 -0.0066 -0.0147 -0.0256 -0.0247 -0.0331 
 [0.0072] [0.0088]***[0.0093]***[0.0085]***[0.0084] [0.0086] [0.0095] [0.0109]** [0.0127]* [0.0148]** 
Age:45-54  
years old 0.0531 0.0599 0.0669 0.0672 0.0547 0.0511 0.0507 0.0468 0.0494 0.0459 
 [0.0070]***[0.0086]***[0.0091]***[0.0083]***[0.0082]***[0.0084]***[0.0092]***[0.0106]*** [0.0122]***[0.0142]***
Tenure in years 0.0265 0.0317 0.0311 0.0302 0.0307 0.0299 0.0282 0.0267 0.0232 0.0173 
 [0.0008]***[0.0011]***[0.0011]***[0.0010]***[0.0010]***[0.0010]***[0.0011]***[0.0013]*** [0.0015]***[0.0017]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0307 -0.0417 -0.0374 -0.0357 -0.0379 -0.0369 -0.0332 -0.0315 -0.0249 -0.0147 
 [0.0029]***[0.0038]***[0.0039]***[0.0035]***[0.0034]***[0.0035]***[0.0038]***[0.0044]*** [0.0051]***[0.0059]** 
Constant 1.4696 1.1286 1.2191 1.2989 1.3634 1.4348 1.5100 1.5952 1.7211 1.9077 
 [0.0091]***[0.0104]***[0.0114]***[0.0107]***[0.0107]***[0.0109]***[0.0120]***[0.01387]***[0.0157]***[0.0179]***
Observations 25994 25994 25994 25994 25994 25994 25994 25994 25994 25994 
R-squared 0.40          
  50 
 
Table A3: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: males, Year: 1995 (cont.) 
 Specification 2 
Min. years of 
education 0.0166 0.0127 0.0131 0.0148 0.0158 0.0152 0.0158 0.0159 0.0175 0.0189 
 [0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0010]***[0.0014]***
Vocational 
degree 0.0614 0.0521 0.0549 0.0635 0.0668 0.0640 0.0668 0.0626 0.0633 0.0560 
 [0.0063]***[0.0077]***[0.0076]***[0.0063]***[0.0073]***[0.0070]***[0.0069]***[0.0074]***[0.0093]***[0.0127]***
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.2713 -0.1503 -0.1824 -0.2004 -0.2185 -0.2355 -0.2704 -0.3059 -0.3418 -0.4120 
 [0.0105]***[0.0127]***[0.0128]***[0.0106]***[0.0122]***[0.0117]***[0.0116]***[0.0125]***[0.0158]***[0.0216]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.1287 -0.0875 -0.0877 -0.1017 -0.1052 -0.1109 -0.1264 -0.1359 -0.1475 -0.1770 
 [0.0070]***[0.0082]***[0.0084]***[0.0070]***[0.0081]***[0.0078]***[0.0078]***[0.0084]***[0.0106]***[0.0145]***
Age:35-44 years 
old -0.0016 0.0215 0.0188 0.0134 0.0075 0.0060 0.0032 -0.0016 -0.0101 -0.0240 
 [0.0065] [0.0078]***[0.0078]** [0.0065]** [0.0075] [0.0072] [0.0071] [0.0077] [0.0096] [0.0131]* 
Age:45-54 years 
old 0.0452 0.0569 0.0576 0.0488 0.0477 0.0488 0.0466 0.0412 0.0332 0.0354 
 [0.0063]***[0.0077]***[0.0077]***[0.0063]***[0.0073]***[0.0070]***[0.0069]***[0.0074]***[0.0092]***[0.0126]***
Tenure in years 0.0224 0.0237 0.0249 0.0247 0.0251 0.0244 0.0239 0.0218 0.0192 0.0152 
 [0.0008]***[0.0010]***[0.0010]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0012]***[0.0016]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0233 -0.0240 -0.0264 -0.0252 -0.0264 -0.0252 -0.0253 -0.0208 -0.0169 -0.0123 
 [0.0026]***[0.0033]***[0.0033]***[0.0027]***[0.0031]***[0.0029]***[0.0029]***[0.0031]***[0.0039]***[0.0054]** 
Constant 1.6815 1.3497 1.3808 1.4119 1.5052 1.5677 1.7074 1.8968 2.0053 2.1575 
 [0.0582]***[0.0697]***[0.0696]***[0.0576]***[0.0663]***[0.0635]***[0.0626]***[0.0674]***[0.0842]***[0.1157]***
Observations 25882 25882 25882 25882 25882 25882 25882 25882 25882 25882 
R-squared 0.53                   
Notes: as in Table A1. 
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Table A4: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: males, Year: 2002 
                                                                              Quantile estimations 
 
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
 Specification 1 
Min. years of 
education 0.0490 0.0345 0.0383 0.0417 0.0452 0.0464 0.0491 0.0515 0.0539 0.0579 
 [0.0007]***[0.0008]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0007]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0010]***[0.0014]***
Vocational 
degree -0.0527 -0.0172 -0.0349 -0.0449 -0.0572 -0.0529 -0.0568 -0.0591 -0.0712 -0.0845 
 [0.0067]***[0.0086]** [0.0080]***[0.0078]***[0.0076]***[0.0076]***[0.0089]***[0.0086]***[0.0091]***[0.0126]***
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.3965 -0.1837 -0.2237 -0.2564 -0.3091 -0.3652 -0.4267 -0.4783 -0.5557 -0.6599 
 [0.0122]***[0.0153]***[0.0142]***[0.0140]***[0.0137]***[0.0138]***[0.0162]***[0.0157]***[0.0167]***[0.0233]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.2453 -0.1201 -0.1441 -0.1597 -0.1977 -0.2337 -0.2754 -0.2944 -0.3305 -0.3756 
 [0.0095]***[0.0117]***[0.0109]***[0.0108]***[0.0106]***[0.0106]***[0.0125]***[0.0126]***[0.0130]***[0.0182]***
Age:35-44  
years old -0.0740 -0.0286 -0.0267 -0.0215 -0.0419 -0.0649 -0.0829 -0.0894 -0.1168 -0.1405 
 [0.0091]***[0.0113]** [0.0105]** [0.0104]** [0.0102]***[0.0102]***[0.0120]***[0.0116]***[0.0123]***[0.0172]***
Age:45-54  
years old -0.0045 0.0497 0.0472 0.0431 0.0245 0.0038 -0.0144 -0.0280 -0.0518 -0.0641 
 [0.0087] [0.0109]***[0.0101]***[0.0100]***[0.0097]** [0.0097] [0.0114] [0.0110]** [0.0117]***[0.0163]***
Tenure in years 0.0285 0.0314 0.0311 0.0311 0.0315 0.0310 0.0299 0.0293 0.0274 0.0225 
 [0.0008]***[0.0011]***[0.0010]***[0.0010]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0011]***[0.0010]***[0.0011]***[0.0016]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0193 -0.0199 -0.0127 -0.0113 -0.0147 -0.0177 -0.0205 -0.0242 -0.0263 -0.0243 
 [0.0029]***[0.0040]***[0.0036]***[0.0034]***[0.0033]***[0.0033]***[0.0038]***[0.0037]***[0.0039]***[0.0055]***
Constant 1.3888 1.0507 1.1330 1.1909 1.2608 1.3579 1.4513 1.5417 1.6788 1.8715 
 [0.0109]***[0.0130]***[0.0123]***[0.0123]***[0.0121]***[0.0123]***[0.0145]***[0.0139]***[0.0147]***[0.0203]***
Observations 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 
R-squared 0.52          
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Table A4: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: males, Year: 2002 (cont.) 
 Specification 2 
Min. years of 
education 0.0208 0.0165 0.0168 0.0183 0.0184 0.0191 0.0195 0.0209 0.0217 0.0223 
 [0.0008]***[0.0011]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0010]***[0.0009]***[0.0010]***[0.0012]***[0.0015]***
Vocational 
degree -0.0124 -0.0123 -0.0146 -0.0116 -0.0128 -0.0095 -0.0104 -0.0184 -0.0239 -0.0202 
 [0.0063]** [0.0082] [0.0067]** [0.0067]* [0.0069]* [0.0073] [0.0067] [0.0074]** [0.0092]***[0.0116]* 
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.3346 -0.1822 -0.2342 -0.2486 -0.2839 -0.3012 -0.3179 -0.3507 -0.3895 -0.4229 
 [0.0110]***[0.0142]***[0.0115]***[0.0117]***[0.0120]***[0.0128]***[0.0118]***[0.0130*** [0.0163]***[0.0208]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.2141 -0.1111 -0.1552 -0.1634 -0.1860 -0.2022 -0.2115 -0.2249 -0.2441 -0.2434 
 [0.0085]***[0.0108]***[0.0088]***[0.0090]***[0.0092]***[0.0099]***[0.0091]***[0.0101]***[0.0126]***[0.0162]***
Age:35-44 years 
old -0.0685 -0.0254 -0.0470 -0.0473 -0.0578 -0.0618 -0.0637 -0.0718 -0.0760 -0.0621 
 [0.0081]***[0.0105]** [0.0085]***[0.0087]***[0.0089]***[0.0095]***[0.0087]***[0.0096]***[0.0120]***[0.0152]***
Age:45-54 years 
old -0.0165 0.0215 0.0004 0.0052 -0.0048 -0.0129 -0.0202 -0.0241 -0.0289 -0.0189 
 [0.0077]** [0.0099]** [0.0081] [0.0082] [0.0084] [0.0090] [0.0083]** [0.0091]***[0.0114]** [0.0144] 
Tenure in years 0.0216 0.0282 0.0267 0.0255 0.0242 0.0232 0.0227 0.0211 0.0192 0.0162 
 [0.0007]***[0.0010]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]***[0.0011]***[0.0014]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0165 -0.0281 -0.0239 -0.0210 -0.0191 -0.0170 -0.0165 -0.0143 -0.0109 -0.0074 
 [0.0026]***[0.0034]***[0.0028]***[0.0028]***[0.0028]***[0.0030]***[0.0028]***[0.0031]***[0.0039]***[0.0049] 
Constant 1.8026 1.3386 1.4204 1.5307 1.6210 1.8157 1.8786 1.9067 2.2022 2.2230 
 [0.0490]***[0.0578]***[0.0495]***[0.0512]***[0.0528]***[0.0565]***[0.0520]***[0.0567]***[0.0658]***[0.0828]***
Observations 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 25964 
R-squared 0.62          
Notes: as in Table A1. 
 
 
  53 
 
Table A5: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: females, Year: 1995 
           
                                                                              Quantile estimations 
 
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
 Specification 1 
Min. years of 
education 0.0360 0.0161 0.0204 0.0242 0.0273 0.0320 0.0346 0.0376 0.0428 0.0501 
 [0.0007]*** [0.0008]***[0.0005]***[0.0006]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]***[0.0010]***[0.0011]***[0.0019]***
Vocational 
degree 0.1027 0.0942 0.0878 0.1216 0.1121 0.1057 0.1181 0.1096 0.0870 0.0808 
 [0.0210]*** [0.0236]***[0.0166]***[0.0189]***[0.0225]***[0.0242]***[0.0256]***[0.0278]***[0.0286]***[0.0470]* 
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.1971 -0.0843 -0.1041 -0.1259 -0.1594 -0.1830 -0.1780 -0.2000 -0.2187 -0.3010 
 [0.0143]*** [0.0161]***[0.0115]***[0.0128]***[0.0154]***[0.0166]***[0.0177]***[0.0193]***[0.0202]***[0.0335]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.0580 -0.0140 -0.0131 -0.0216 -0.0297 -0.0449 -0.0355 -0.0491 -0.0545 -0.0949 
 [0.01278]***[0.0142] [0.0102] [0.0114]* [0.0137]** [0.0147]***[0.0157]** [0.0171]***[0.0178]***[0.0295]***
Age:35-44  
years old 0.0526 0.0525 0.0676 0.0737 0.0660 0.0609 0.0739 0.0673 0.0661 0.0259 
 [0.0122]*** [0.0138]***[0.0099]***[0.0110]***[0.0132]***[0.0142]***[0.0150]***[0.0163]***[0.0169]***[0.0278] 
Age:45-54  
years old 0.0562 0.0373 0.0582 0.0668 0.0589 0.0660 0.0710 0.0637 0.0673 0.0380 
 [0.0125]*** [0.0142]***[0.0101]***[0.0113]***[0.0135]***[0.0145]***[0.0154]***[0.0166]***[0.0172]***[0.0282] 
Tenure in years 0.0245 0.0236 0.0243 0.0255 0.0244 0.0246 0.0247 0.0257 0.0256 0.0221 
 [0.0011]*** [0.0012]***[0.0009]***[0.0010]***[0.0012]***[0.0013]***[0.0013]***[0.0015]***[0.0015]***[0.0024]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0149 -0.0217 -0.0143 -0.0142 -0.0079 -0.0070 -0.0066 -0.0116 -0.0173 -0.0134 
 [0.0044]*** [0.0051]***[0.0036]***[0.0040]***[0.0048]* [0.0051] [0.0054] [0.0058]** [0.0059]***[0.0095] 
Constant 1.1761 1.1117 1.1169 1.1260 1.1588 1.1708 1.1913 1.2325 1.2706 1.3881 
 [0.0136]*** [0.0147]***[0.0105]***[0.0118]***[0.0144]***[0.0157]***[0.0169]***[0.0184]***[0.0191]***[0.0308]***
Observations 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 
R-squared 0.43          
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Table A5: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: females, Year: 1995 (cont.) 
 Specification 2 
Min. years of 
education 0.0151 0.0089 0.0093 0.0103 0.0112 0.0125 0.0138 0.0148 0.0159 0.0183 
 [0.0010]***[0.0012]***[0.0011]***[0.0012]***[0.0009]***[0.0011]***[0.0011]***[0.0013]***[0.0016]***[0.0019]***
Vocational 
degree 0.0681 0.0295 0.0226 0.0518 0.0624 0.0771 0.0876 0.0896 0.0586 0.0962 
 [0.0186]***[0.0212] [0.0211] [0.0220]** [0.0175]***[0.0214]***[0.0204]***[0.0242]***[0.0288]** [0.0353]***
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.1493 -0.0914 -0.0913 -0.1116 -0.1193 -0.1295 -0.1337 -0.1382 -0.1490 -0.2126 
 [0.0127]***[0.0145]***[0.0145]***[0.0150]***[0.0120]***[0.0147]***[0.0142]***[0.0169]***[0.0201]***[0.0251]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.0405 -0.0077 -0.0056 -0.0143 -0.0202 -0.0293 -0.0360 -0.0388 -0.0406 -0.0748 
 [0.0113]***[0.0129] [0.0128] [0.0133] [0.0107]* [0.0131]** [0.0126]***[0.0149]***[0.0178]** [0.0219]***
Age:35-44 years 
old 0.0524 0.0648 0.0667 0.0568 0.0561 0.0544 0.0503 0.0479 0.0486 0.0133 
 [0.0108]***[0.0124]***[0.0124]***[0.0129]***[0.0103]***[0.0125]***[0.0120]***[0.0142]***[0.0168]***[0.0204] 
Age:45-54 years 
old 0.0480 0.0430 0.0520 0.0482 0.0511 0.0471 0.0405 0.0464 0.0468 0.0183 
 [0.0110]***[0.0127]***[0.0127]***[0.0132]***[0.0105]***[0.0127]***[0.0122]***[0.0144]***[0.0170]***[0.0206] 
Tenure in years 0.0188 0.0239 0.0212 0.0195 0.0191 0.0182 0.0176 0.0172 0.0152 0.0121 
 [0.0010]***[0.0011]***[0.0011]***[0.0012]***[0.0009]***[0.0011]***[0.0011]***[0.0013]***[0.0015]***[0.0019]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0063 -0.0323 -0.0162 -0.0060 -0.0056 -0.0009 0.0023 0.0025 0.0118 0.0165 
 [0.0040] [0.0045]***[0.0044]***[0.0047] [0.0037] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0051] [0.0060]** [0.0074]** 
Constant 1.4723 1.3263 1.3571 1.3595 1.4001 1.4654 1.5310 1.5905 1.6070 1.7782 
 [0.0390]***[0.0424]***[0.0446]***[0.0458]***[0.0369]***[0.0447]***[0.0427]***[0.0499]***[0.0600]***[0.0697]***
Observations 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 
R-squared 0.57          
Notes: as in Table A1. 
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Table A6: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: females, Year: 2002 
                                                                              Quantile estimations 
 
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
 Specification 1 
Min. years of 
education 0.0497 0.0307 0.0341 0.0380 0.0430 0.0455 0.0504 0.0517 0.0549 0.0606 
 [0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0008]*** [0.00071]***[0.0009]***[0.0011]***[0.0011]***[0.0012]***[0.0015]***[0.0017]***
Vocational 
degree -0.0225 0.0121 -0.0148 -0.0314 -0.0346 -0.0300 -0.0348 -0.0401 -0.0353 0.0061 
 [0.0111]** [0.0133] [0.0113] [0.00991]***[0.0113]***[0.0131]** [0.0138]** [0.0134]***[0.0167]** [0.0185] 
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.2834 -0.1571 -0.1660 -0.1977 -0.2599 -0.2895 -0.3239 -0.3359 -0.3476 -0.4266 
 [0.0161]***[0.0193]***[0.0167]*** [0.01421]***[0.0164]***[0.0189]***[0.0200]***[0.0195]***[0.0245]***[0.0273]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.1613 -0.0804 -0.0894 -0.1108 -0.1516 -0.1592 -0.1935 -0.1920 -0.1921 -0.2282 
 [0.0145]***[0.0175]***[0.0147]*** [0.0129]*** [0.0148]***[0.0171]***[0.0180]***[0.0176]***[0.0220]***[0.0243]***
Age:35-44  
years old -0.0507 -0.0151 -0.0123 -0.0150 -0.0362 -0.0360 -0.0650 -0.0622 -0.0631 -0.0995 
 [0.0142]***[0.0171] [0.0144] [0.0126] [0.0144]** [0.0167]** [0.0175]***[0.0171]***[0.0213]***[0.0235]***
Age:45-54  
years old -0.0148 0.0078 0.0149 0.0156 -0.0140 -0.0149 -0.0381 -0.0281 -0.0141 -0.0419 
 [0.01448] [0.0172] [0.0146] [0.0128] [0.0147] [0.0170] [0.0178]** [0.0173] [0.0217] [0.0239]* 
Tenure in years 0.0313 0.0328 0.0302 0.0286 0.0281 0.0283 0.0288 0.0296 0.0281 0.0267 
 [0.0010]***[0.0012]***[0.0011]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]***[0.0012]***[0.0013]***[0.0012]***[0.0015]***[0.0017]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0251 -0.0406 -0.0247 -0.0112 -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0112 -0.0114 -0.0171 
 [0.0043]***[0.0053]***[0.00461]***[0.0040]*** [0.0045] [0.0051] [0.0052] [0.0051]** [0.0064]* [0.0073]** 
Constant 1.1660 0.9943 1.0553 1.0959 1.1374 1.1821 1.2264 1.2936 1.3615 1.4854 
 [0.0155]***[0.0174]***[0.01481]***[0.0132]*** [0.0155]***[0.0182]***[0.0195]***[0.0192]***[0.0242]***[0.0267]***
Observations 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 
R-squared 0.45          
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Table A6: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: females, Year: 2002 (cont.) 
 Specification 2 
Min. years of 
education 0.0176 0.0129 0.0144 0.0138 0.0142 0.0146 0.0156 0.0164 0.0180 0.0197 
 [0.0011]***[0.0014]***[0.0011]***[0.0010]***[0.0010]***[0.0009]***[0.0011]***[0.0013]***[0.0015]***[0.0021]***
Vocational 
degree -0.0109 0.0097 -0.0022 -0.0041 -0.0166 -0.0198 -0.0153 -0.0204 -0.0154 -0.0090 
 [0.0097] [0.0123] [0.0094] [0.0090] [0.0087]* [0.0082]** [0.0100] [0.0118]* [0.0125] [0.0181] 
Age:15-24 years 
old -0.2420 -0.1265 -0.1400 -0.1728 -0.1896 -0.1957 -0.2226 -0.2569 -0.2787 -0.3359 
 [0.0140]***[0.0180]***[0.0136]***[0.0131]***[0.0126]***[0.0119]***[0.0146]***[0.0173]***[0.0187]***[0.0270]***
Age:25-34 years 
old -0.1348 -0.0605 -0.0742 -0.0982 -0.1081 -0.1062 -0.1200 -0.1445 -0.1479 -0.1683 
 [0.0126]***[0.0162]***[0.0121]***[0.0117]***[0.0113]***[0.0106]***[0.0131]***[0.0155]***[0.0167]***[0.0239]***
Age:35-44 years 
old -0.0432 0.0082 -0.0011 -0.0196 -0.0302 -0.0279 -0.0346 -0.0534 -0.0480 -0.0545 
 [0.0122]***[0.0158] [0.0119] [0.0114]* [0.0110]***[0.0103]***[0.0127]***[0.0150]***[0.0161]***[0.0229]** 
Age:45-54 years 
old -0.0135 0.0182 0.0115 -0.0029 -0.0160 -0.0044 -0.0108 -0.0275 -0.0183 -0.0229 
 [0.0124] [0.0159] [0.0120] [0.0115] [0.0112] [0.0105] [0.0129] [0.0152]* [0.0163] [0.0232] 
Tenure in years 0.0251 0.0325 0.0284 0.0248 0.0236 0.0233 0.0224 0.0208 0.0191 0.0171 
 [0.0009]***[0.0012]***[0.0009]***[0.0009]***[0.0008]***[0.0008]***[0.0009]***[0.0011]***[0.0012]***[0.0017]***
Tenure 
squared/100 -0.0263 -0.0526 -0.0351 -0.0208 -0.0154 -0.0134 -0.0106 -0.0062 -0.0043 -0.0034 
 [0.0038]***[0.0047]***[0.0036]***[0.0035]***[0.0034]***[0.0032]***[0.0039]***[0.0046] [0.0049] [0.0072] 
Constant 1.6458 1.3300 1.4183 1.5260 1.5788 1.5813 1.6084 1.7160 1.9706 2.0660 
 [0.0436]***[0.0546]***[0.0415]***[0.0399]***[0.0390]***[0.0367]***[0.0451]***[0.0525]***[0.0560]***[0.0807]***
Observations 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 
R-squared 0.6          
Notes: as in Table A1. 
 
 
  
 
 
Table A7: Breakdown of observed wage changed by decile 
  10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
   
  All 
Observed pay change (in 
logs) 
-
0.021 
-
0.014 
-
0.008 
-
0.008 0.007 0.048 0.100 0.147 0.195 
Composition effects of:          
 worker characteristics 
-
0.049 
-
0.056 
-
0.062 
-
0.068 
-
0.083 
-
0.059 
-
0.063 
-
0.035 0.031 
 job characteristics 
-
0.033 
-
0.012 
-
0.017 
-
0.026 
-
0.010 0.007 0.062 0.094 0.115 
Price effects of:          
 constant 
-
0.001 0.044 0.092 0.154 0.127 0.126 0.095 0.278 0.177 
 worker characteristics 0.036 0.011 
-
0.002 
-
0.018 
-
0.034 
-
0.028 
-
0.020 
-
0.014 0.006 
 job characteristics 0.000 
-
0.014 
-
0.039 
-
0.072 
-
0.025 
-
0.015 0.020 
-
0.180 
-
0.094 
Residual effects 0.026 0.012 0.020 0.021 0.031 0.017 0.005 0.003 
-
0.039 
           
  Males 
Observed pay change (in 
logs) 
-
0.046 
-
0.041 
-
0.030 
-
0.013 0.027 0.084 0.124 0.174 0.211 
Composition effects of:          
 worker characteristics 
-
0.068 
-
0.072 
-
0.073 
-
0.057 
-
0.081 
-
0.041 
-
0.023 0.027 0.064 
 job characteristics 
-
0.039 
-
0.020 
-
0.018 
-
0.010 0.001 0.076 0.077 0.112 0.118 
Price effects of:          
 constant 
-
0.011 0.040 0.119 0.116 0.248 0.171 0.010 0.197 0.066 
 worker characteristics 0.023 
-
0.016 
-
0.012 
-
0.041 
-
0.032 
-
0.032 
-
0.016 
-
0.005 0.017 
 job characteristics 0.024 0.010 
-
0.055 
-
0.021 
-
0.157 
-
0.095 0.068 
-
0.141 
-
0.049 
Residual effects 0.025 0.017 0.009 0.000 0.048 0.005 0.008 
-
0.015 
-
0.004 
           
  Females 
Observed pay change (in 
logs) 0.001 0.021 0.037 0.043 0.060 0.074 0.109 0.163 0.213 
Composition effects of:          
 worker characteristics 
-
0.042 
-
0.037 
-
0.035 
-
0.041 
-
0.045 
-
0.031 
-
0.028 0.007 0.036 
 job characteristics 
-
0.024 
-
0.014 
-
0.008 
-
0.013 0.002 0.016 0.013 0.061 0.084 
Price effects of:          
 constant 0.004 0.061 0.166 0.179 0.116 0.077 0.125 0.364 0.288 
 worker characteristics 0.023 0.016 
-
0.015 
-
0.026 
-
0.020 
-
0.029 
-
0.055 
-
0.052 
-
0.032 
 job characteristics 
-
0.004 
-
0.024 
-
0.085 
-
0.070 
-
0.007 0.048 0.042 
-
0.195 
-
0.125 
Residual effects 0.044 0.019 0.013 0.014 0.014 
-
0.008 0.011 
-
0.022 
-
0.038 
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Figure A1: Bootstrapped employee characteristics by sex and year 
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Figure A2: Changes in the estimated returns to employee characteristics over 
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